The current cash related issue is well on the way to make huge inconsistencies

 The current money related issue is clearly going to pass on basic contrasts in monetary execution over the long term. Finally, while a few countries will be undeniably more inimically affected than the other, those that do (in light of everything) better will share three key qualities: nicely low open obligation, strong close by intrigue drove improvement and an overwhelming remarkable government.

The world economy faces broad weakness due to COVID-19. Will the euro-zone make sense of how to filter through its issues and dismiss a partition? Will the US engineer an approach to reestablished advancement?

The reactions to these requests will choose how the overall economy creates all through the accompanying very few years. Nonetheless, paying little notice to how these brief challenges are settled, obviously the world economy is entering an inconvenient new longer-term stage as well – one that will be significantly less warm to money related advancement than possibly some other period.

Without a doubt, in fundamentally totally advanced economies, raised degrees of irregularity, strains on the cubicle class, and developing masses will fuel political battle in a setting of joblessness and meager financial resources. As these old lion's share rule governments continuously turn inward, they will end up being less helpful associates all around the world – less prepared to help the multilateral trading structure and more set up to respond uniquely to money related plans elsewhere that they see as hurting to their tendencies.

This is such a general condition that lessens each nation's believable new development. The sure thing is that we won't see a re-appearance of such a headway that the world – particularly the creation scene – experienced in the twenty years before the budgetary emergency. It is a space that will make critical abnormalities in budgetary execution around the globe. Several nations will be essentially more unfavorably affected than others.

Regaining of market in some specific areas of business post corona period

 After COVID-19 lock-down and anti-china sentiment. The mobile phone, Tab phone and computer segments sales have increased. Due to the remote working, work from home, online classes. the demand in mobiles and computer sector has increased. 

so Samsung has seen the sales on strong demand  doubled in July. Time is the only essence at the present situation. their is a demand in digital sales than physical. even many online application have increased for the promotion of their products. 

considering the large volumes and the only standard assets are eligible under the proposed scheme. even BYJU's an educational app is in great demand. 

the small companies starved for credit in reverse order during lock-down and post corona.

• large industries sales lessened to 1.4 from 7.2
• Medium industries sales lessened to -9 from 1.7
• micro/small industries sales lessened to -3.7 from 0.6

On some industries there was no impact before and after corona

• No Impact Industries pre & post COVID are

1. Agriculture - 9.8 
2. Food processing -1.6
3. pharma -0.5

• Stressed Industries pre & post COVID are

1. Non Banking Financial companies (NBFC) -8
2. Power - 5.7
3. Steel -2.7

• Impacted industries pre & post COVID are

1. Retail Trade -2.9
2. Wholesale Trade -2.5
3. Roads -1.9

pre-corona and post-corona, due to the absence of physical meetings. people have been chosen alternatives like Facebook, Instagram, Whats up. so business is running via digital market.

       

Crisis in stock market

After the decline of  sensex index in trading of stock market i.e., sensex was down by 723 points, NIFTY down by 228 points, Gold up by 45 points. But yesterday almost R.S 2.89 lakh crore  evopourated in a day. So now its good time to enter the trading market by getting a through analysis of market and then invest. Because  analysts believe stocks with good earning prospects  are at cheap valuation. Inspite of  of the downtrend of market since 3 weeks by 2400 points, there was flash sale.

There  was almost 17 lakhs NIFTY trading  within 2 minutes  which is known as flash sale

ICICI bank earning was down , BHEL, Bata india, Crompton Greaves and L&T finance was down by 30%

There was a little rise in Bharati Airtel

inflation in india

India has a proud record on inflation. Between independence in 1947 and 2000, prices rose in double digits only 21% of the time, mainly during the oil shocks of the 1970s. Accepted wisdom is that inflation hurts the poor most and, since most people are poor, can quickly lead to a backlash. “Price rises in India have ignited student riots, nationwide demonstrations and government collapse,” writes Nandan Nilekani in his bestselling book, “Imagining India”.

That logic may soon be tested. Like most emerging economies, India has slowed; unlike them, inflation has stayed high since late 2009, always flirting with double digits. Now, at last, it seems to be heading down. In July wholesale prices rose by 6.9%; “core” inflation, which excludes food, among other things, has been 5-6% for several months. The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) targets wholesale inflation of about 5%.

India’s industrialists and some politicians are screaming for lower interest rates. Growth has fallen to about 5% and private investment has dried up. Having engineered a slump to satisfy its rigid obsession with low inflation, they argue, the RBI can at last slash rates to kick-start growth.

Will the RBI oblige? It is still worried about inflation. Food prices may rise because of a poor monsoon. Other one-off shocks are likely. Oil prices are creeping up. The figures do not yet reflect widespread increases in electricity tariffs. Suppressed inflation, thanks to state subsidies of fuel, is running at two or three percentage points. If the government is to repair its dodgy finances this year it will have to cut those subsidies, pushing prices up. Lastly, the RBI doubts that interest rates, which in real terms are not that high, explain the slump in investment. Bad governance and a lack of reforms do. Much lower rates might end up resurrecting inflation, but not growth.

The stage is set for a confrontation. The ruling Congress-led coalition, unable or unwilling to pass reforms and facing an election in 2014, wants looser monetary policy. Under the previous finance minister, Pranab Mukherjee, its outbursts came uncomfortably close to political interference. The new finance minister, Palaniappan Chidambaram, has already asked state-owned banks to cut rates on consumer loans to revive demand.

Since the mid-1990s the RBI’s independence has been accepted by the political class. Its real guarantor, though, is a sense that sound money is what most Indians want, even at the price of temporarily lower growth. But lately there has been little anguish about inflation. One theory is that the public’s dislike of high prices is a myth—some studies suggest high growth, not low inflation, wins votes. In a survey after the 2009 elections voters put inflation as only a middle-ranking concern. Fast-rising rural wages may also have insulated the poor.

Another theory is that the decline of India’s Marxist parties, the rise of regional politicians and a vocal anti-corruption movement all mean that public anger over high prices is somehow being deflected. Whatever the explanation, for the RBI the lack of public outcry is a worry. It’s a lot easier to be independent if you have 1.2 billion people on your side.

the current economic climate is likely to produce deep disparities

The current economic climate is likely to produce deep disparities in economic performance over the long-term. Ultimately, while some countries will be far more adversely affected than the other, those that do (relatively) better will share three key characteristics: relatively low public debt, strong domestic demand-led growth and a robust democracy.

The world economy faces considerable uncertainty in the short term. Will the eurozone manage to sort out its problems and avert a breakup? Will the United States engineer a path to renewed growth? Will China find a way to reverse its economic slowdown?

The answers to these questions will determine how the global economy evolves over the next few years. But, regardless of how these immediate challenges are resolved, it is clear that the world economy is entering a difficult new longer-term phase as well – one that will be substantially less hospitable to economic growth than possibly any other period since the end of World War II.

Regardless of how they handle their current difficulties, Europe and America will emerge with high debt, low growth rates, and contentious domestic politics. Even in the best-case scenario, in which the euro remains intact, Europe will be bogged down with the demanding task of rebuilding its frayed union. And, in the US, ideological polarization between Democrats and Republicans will continue to paralyze economic policy.

Indeed, in virtually all advanced economies, high levels of inequality, strains on the middle class, and aging populations will fuel political strife in a context of unemployment and scarce fiscal resources. As these old democracies increasingly turn inward, they will become less helpful partners internationally – less willing to sustain the multilateral trading system and more ready to respond unilaterally to economic policies elsewhere that they perceive as damaging to their interests.

Meanwhile, large emerging markets such as China, India, and Brazil are unlikely to fill the void, as they will remain keen to protect their national sovereignty and room to manoeuvre. As a result, the possibilities for global cooperation on economic and other matters will recede further.

This is the kind of global environment that diminishes every country’s potential growth. The safe bet is that we will not see a return to the kind of growth that the world – especially the developing world – experienced in the two decades before the financial crisis. It is an environment that will produce deep disparities in economic performance around the world. Some countries will be much more adversely affected than others.

Those that do relatively better will share three characteristics. First, they will not be weighed down by high levels of public debt. Second, they will not be overly reliant on the world economy, and their engine of economic growth will be internal rather than external. Finally, they will be robust democracies.

Having low to moderate levels of public debt is important, because debt levels that reach 80-90 percent of GDP become a serious drag on economic growth. They immobilize fiscal policy, lead to serious distortions in the financial system, trigger political fights over taxation, and incite costly distributional conflicts. Governments preoccupied with reducing debt are unlikely to undertake the investments needed for long-term structural change. With few exceptions (such as Australia and New Zealand), the vast majority of the world’s advanced economies are or will soon be in this category.

Many emerging-market economies, such as Brazil and Turkey, have managed to rein in the growth of public debt this time around. But they have not prevented a borrowing binge in their private sectors. Since private debts have a way of turning into public liabilities, a low government-debt burden might not, in fact, provide these countries with the cushion that they think they have.

Countries that rely excessively on world markets and global finance to fuel their economic growth will also be at a disadvantage. A fragile world economy will not be hospitable to large net foreign borrowers (or large net foreign lenders). Countries with large current-account deficits (such as Turkey) will remain hostage to skittish market sentiment. Those with large surpluses (such as China) will be under increasing pressure – including the threat of retaliation – to rein in their “mercantilist” policies.

Domestic demand-led growth will be a more reliable strategy than export-led growth. That means that countries with a large domestic market and a prosperous middle class will have an important advantage.

Finally, democracies will do better because they have the institutionalized mechanisms of conflict management that authoritarian regimes lack. Democracies such as India may seem at times to move too slowly and be prone to paralysis. But they provide the arenas of consultation, cooperation, and give-and-take among opposing social groups that are crucial in times of turbulence and shocks.

In the absence of such institutions, distributive conflict can easily spill over into protests, riots, and civil disorder. This is where democratic India and South Africa have the upper hand over China or Russia. Countries that have fallen into the grip of autocratic leaders – for example, Argentina and Turkey – are also increasingly at a disadvantage.

An important indicator of the magnitude of the new global economy’s challenges is that so few countries satisfy all three requirements. Indeed, some of the most spectacular economic success stories of our time – China in particular – fail to meet more than one.

It will be a difficult time for all. But some – think Brazil, India, and South Korea – will be in a better position than the rest.

If the credit cycle has got out of hand, who is to blame?

Fifteen years ago this month, Thailand at last allowed its currency, the baht, to fall against the dollar, abandoning a long, losing battle with market forces. “I haven’t slept for two months,” said the governor of the central bank on the day of the devaluation. “I think that tonight I’ll be able to sleep at last.” What followed was a five-year nightmare for emerging markets, as the financial crisis spread to Thailand’s neighbours, then to Russia and Brazil, before eventually claiming Argentina and Uruguay in July 2002.

After the tossing and turning of 1997-2002, the next decade went like a dream. In 2003 China resumed double-digit growth; India’s economy expanded by 8%, a feat it would surpass in four of the next six years; Brazil’s new president, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, appeased the IMF and the bond markets by cutting public debt and achieving the first of five annual current-account surpluses. Goldman Sachs released the first of its 2050 projections (“Dreaming with the BRICs”, its catchy acronym for Brazil, Russia, India and China), suggesting that the big emerging economies would eventually inherit the Earth.

The crisis-hit countries emerged from devaluation, default and distress with low expectations, cheap and flexible currencies, scope to borrow and room to grow. Global capital markets welcomed them back, buying their equities and their bonds, even when denominated in their own currencies. The popular emerging-markets stockmarket index compiled by MSCI rose by over 350% from the end of 2002 to its peak in October 2007.

Rather than spend these capital inflows, emerging economies recycled them. They amassed foreign-exchange reserves as a guarantee against ever again succumbing to a currency crisis or the ministrations of the IMF. Some have even begun to help fund the fight against crises elsewhere. On July 10th Indonesia’s central bank confirmed it would buy $1 billion of the IMF’s notes, a poignant reversal of roles.

But after a dream decade, something is amiss. China is now struggling to grow as fast as 8% (its GDP expanded by 7.6% in the year to the second quarter). India, a country that once aspired to double-digit growth, can now only dream of ridding itself of double-digit inflation. None of the biggest emerging economies stands on the edge of a dramatic financial precipice, like their counterparts in the euro area, or a fiscal cliff, like America’s. But their economic prospects have nonetheless started to head downhill.

The MSCI emerging-market index is flat for the year and still 30% below its 2007 peak. Only 15 months ago, the IMF’s forecasters expected Brazil’s economy to grow by over 4% this year. This week their 2012 forecast was just 2.5% (see chart 1). Over the same period, South Africa’s 2012 growth forecast was cut from 3.8% to 2.6%.

Some of this slowdown can be blamed on events elsewhere. Europe’s pain, for example, has spread far beyond its immediate neighbours. The European Union remains the biggest foreign market for many emerging economies, buying about 19% of China’s exports and 22% of South Africa’s. Euro-area banks have also begun to sell assets and withdraw lending. They account for about 45% of credit to emerging Europe and a substantial share of trade credit in Asia.

Some of the slowdown was also orchestrated by governments nervous about price pressures or property bubbles. Poland’s central bank raised rates as recently as May to quell inflation, which persists above its 2.5% target. China’s premier, Wen Jiabao, fell into a game of chicken with the country’s 50,000 property developers, waiting for them to cut prices, even as they waited for him to lift restrictions on multiple home purchases. As growth slows, policymakers will ease in response.

But there is more to this story. The slowdown is not simply a demand-side phenomenon, the result of weak exports and past tightening dragging growth below its long-run potential. The underlying rate of sustainable growth may also be less impressive than previously thought. As the IMF pointed out this week, the last decade or so may have “generated overly optimistic expectations about potential growth”.

High commodity prices boosted some emerging economies, such as Brazil, Russia and South Africa. They also flattered emerging-market share prices. As Bank of America Merrill Lynch observes, natural-resource industries account for more than a third of the market capitalisation of the BRICs and over a quarter of the market cap of MSCI’s benchmark index.

The dream decade was also sweetened by rapid credit growth, according to the fund. The ratio of bank credit to GDP has risen steeply in many emerging economies over the past ten years. From trough to peak, it rose by over 20 percentage points in Brazil, China, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Malaysia, Poland, South Korea, Taiwan and Turkey. It rose almost as far in India and Russia.

In some emerging economies, the upswing began late in the decade. In China, the credit ratio has risen by over 27 points since 2008 alone. In others, it has already ended: in South Africa, Hungary and South Korea, the credit ratio has fallen substantially since the financial crisis.

A rising credit ratio may represent healthy “financial deepening” as the banking system does a better job of capturing household saving and reallocating it to its best use. But it may also reflect a potentially destabilising “financial cycle”, an upswing in credit and other financial variables, which overlays and often outlasts the swings in GDP and inflation that mark conventional business cycles.

The upturn in the financial cycle may flatter growth, as easy credit encourages spending and speculation, boosting the value of collateral and thus easing credit further. This may have lulled emerging economies into thinking they could grow faster than they really can, just as permissive finance helped persuade the rich world that its growth was more stable than was actually the case.

When credit booms show up in inflation, central banks are typically quick to react. But consumer prices often remain tame, because rising exchange rates and imports fill the gap between expanding domestic demand and supply. That allows the booms to grow dangerously large. Selim Elekdag and Yiqun Wu of the IMF have identified 99 “credit balloons”, episodes of fast credit growth over the past 50 years in rich and emerging economies alike. Of these balloons, 44 popped badly (resulting in a banking crisis, currency crisis or both) and another 13 very badly, with a 9% contraction of GDP on average.

In Asia’s emerging economies, credit ratios have risen further and faster than they did before the Thai crisis, says Frederic Neumann of HSBC. Even so, the region’s central bankers need not lose too much sleep. Now, unlike then, bank loans have not outstripped deposits. And in most countries, domestic investment has not outstripped domestic saving. If foreign capital were to withdraw abruptly as it did 15 years ago, the effects would not be as ruinous. Most foreign-capital inflows come in the form not of debt but equity, which shrinks to fit an economy’s ability to pay. The debt of Asian economies is also now partly in their own currency, which would fall in a crisis, taking some of the strain. If foreign capital retreats, Asia’s surplus countries should have enough resources to replace it, although the switch may not be entirely smooth.

The picture is different in Europe. In Poland, for example, credit to the private sector grew by an extraordinary 36.6% in 2008, contributing to a current-account deficit of almost 9% of GDP. The crisis interrupted these excesses but did not reverse them: the country’s external deficit remains over 5% of GDP. In recent months, the FDI and portfolio capital Poland requires to fill this gap has flowed in the wrong direction. That leaves the country uncomfortably “susceptible” to the euro crisis, says Raffaella Tenconi of Bank of America Merrill Lynch, if it prompts a further withdrawal of cross-border lending.

If the credit cycle has got out of hand, who is to blame? Policymakers in emerging economies sometimes present themselves as powerless victims of vague global forces, such as the “tide of liquidity” supposedly sweeping across the globe, thanks to near-zero interest rates in America, Japan and the euro area. But research by Mr Elekdag and Fei Han, also of the IMF, suggests that such external factors explain only a small portion (16%) of the variation in credit growth in emerging Asia. By imposing curbs on domestic credit and allowing greater flexibility in their currencies, economies can regain greater control.

Winds of Change Affecting Asia

Asia, as a whole, has witnessed tremendous growth in the past decades and city-states such as Hong Kong and Singapore have since joined the ranks of advanced economies. Asian giants are not only home to the largest number of millionaires in the world; Asian millionaires are also becoming increasingly wealthier. With US and European economics stuck in doldrums, could it be Asia’s turn to shine now?

wo recent speeches featured on the Monetary Authority of Singapore website give a pretty good indication of the momentum building up in Asia’s desire to become a global financial super centre. By comparison with the established centers in the West, such as the City of London or Wall Street, Asia suffers from being a highly fragmented “zone“. Indeed, it is so fragmented that it barely qualifies to be considered a zone, despite all the hype about the shift of financial power from West to East. The lack of a pan-Asian settlements infrastructure, the absence of a pan-Asian bond market and capital controls scattered like confetti across the region, all speak of the infancy of the Asian bloc by comparison with its Western rivals. However, it will not be ever thus, and things are changing fast.

Speaking on the occasion of the opening of the second Raffles Tower in Singapore (Raffles Tower One, opened in 1988, is still the third tallest building in Singapore) Finance Minister Tharman Shanmugaratnam spoke both of the rising affluence of Asia’s middle classes and of the opportunities for Asian banks: “Asian banks, which are moderately leveraged, largely deposit-funded and generally conservative in lending, have in recent times, stepped-up their financing activities. As traditional European lenders continue to deleverage, there are opportunities in corporate funding, trade finance and infrastructure finance which Asian banks are well placed to take hold of.”

Asia has also seen rising affluence amongst its population and increased interest from international investors as an investment destination. This has presented greater investor demand, paving the way for the growth of Asia’s capital markets and asset management sectors. These developments will help drive a new chapter in Asian finance.

Those opportunities in trade finance, corporate funding and infrastructure finance highlighted by the Minister are going have a hugely transformative impact on Asian finance in the decades ahead. It seems pretty obvious that the major western investment banks are not going to sit on their hands while this happens. They are already actively forging joint ventures with and investing in Asian players, positioning themselves to share in what promises to be an extremely profitable few decades for Asia – provided, ofcourse, the continent doesn’t fall prey to internecine quarrels, the recent saber rattling between Japan and China over a few rocks protruding from the ocean being a case in point.

While the active involvement of top Western investment banks will undoubtedly bring management skills to Asia, there is always the danger that these bankers will also import that “gotta dance when the music’s playing” attitude that gave us the 2008 global financial smash. So Asian regulators are going to have to keep a sharp weather eye out for incipient bubbles fuelled by advanced economy banksters playing high wide and handsome in developing markets.

The second speech, by Ng Nam Sin, Assistant Managing Director, Development, was given at the OCBC Global Treasury Forum in September 2012. The theme of the forum was “Winds of Change Affecting Asia“, with the larger gales coming, unsurprisingly, from the ongoing European sovereign debt crisis and the fiscal deficit issues in the US. Ng Nam Sin would probably have added QE3 to the list if his speech hadn’t pre-dated the Federal Reserve Chairman’s announcement. As he pointed out, despite all the talk of decoupling, Asia is far from immune to what happens in advanced markets:“Despite our deepening domestic markets, Asia is not insulated from the rest of the world. Outcomes in the developed markets have a profound global impact through trade, commodities prices, and in the valuation of currencies and financial instruments. Through these channels, global winds of change can shake Asia from its long-term path of growth and development”.

On top of this, of course, there is regulatory change, which Asian markets are having to ponder and to decide whether to follow suit exactly, or instead amend to Asian circumstances and risk encouraging regulatory arbitrage. Above all, he wants to see Asian capital markets moving forward and reaching the kind of maturity where indigenous capital can be put to work furthering Asian growth. That is now the Holy Grail of Asian investment initiatives and we can expect to see a continued flurry of developments in this area. Should make for an interesting next 10 years!